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In the 1980s, China underwent sweeping reforms under its leader Deng Xiaoping. Following two decades of Mao Zedong’s hard-line communism, Deng dramatically changed the direction of his country. Among these reforms, Deng instituted a limit on the number of terms a politician could serve as leader. His intention was to prevent China from falling into the destructive one-man despotism embodied by Mao. Deng constructed a complex infrastructure of checks and balances, which allowed senior politicians to hold each other accountable. It was, however, based on a degree of honesty – Deng and his successors were only able to impose limits on others because they themselves also accepted these limits.
For a bit of a history on Mao Zedong, please see below this 10 minute overview:
Fast forward to March 2018 – the Chinese National People’s Congress approves the removal of the two-term limit on presidency. Due to step down in 2023, this change allowed current leader Xi Jinping to remain ‘president for life’. As is typical in Chinese politics, there was no public debate on the issue. The proposal did however trigger rare shows of dissent, with the former editor of the state newspaper, Li Datong, publicly calling the policy a “farce”(Bandurski 2018). How did Xi undo decades of constitutional consensus, and what are the implications for China?
Check out this video by NBC News reporting on the moment when China scrapped the presidential term limit:
The first thing we should ask is how Xi amassed the power to push the change through. Xi sought to establish dominance as soon as he entered office. An anti-corruption campaign, which targeted millions of party officials, allowed him to eliminate his political rivals who, within Deng’s system, were charged with holding him accountable. Critically, this allowed Xi to take control of the Party’s numerous factions, whose competing interests had formerly kept the leader’s power in check. Xi’s influence over the Party, armed forces, and economic elite is reminiscent of the authoritarianism of Mao. It is worth considering therefore, how deep this parallel between Mao and Xi might run?
On the surface, there are clear comparisons to be made. Much of Mao Zedong’s power was built on an elaborately constructed ‘cult of personality’. Art and media, such as opera, were harnessed to strengthen Mao’s support by presenting him as semi-divine. Almost all citizens were issued with, and told to study, the Little Red Book – a collection of Mao’s writings and teachings. Albeit perhaps less obtuse, there are clear indications of Xi constructing for himself a personality cult. In 2017, the Party formalised “Xi Jinping Thought”, which is now mandatory study material at all levels of education. Similarly, you might substitute the Little Red Book for the Party propaganda now plastered across major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. The most modern form of media – online media – is censored by the Party to preserve a perennial positive image of Xi (a prominent recent example being the removal of images which liken his appearance to Winnie the Pooh).
Xi Jinping Thought is a comprehensive political ideology that emphasises the central role of the Communist Party in all aspects of Chinese life, advocating for socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and focusing on national rejuvenation, economic reform, and strict party discipline.
However, are there deeper, perhaps more consequential, similarities between the two men’s philosophies? Both show a disregard for political institutions – their policies instead emphasise their own centrality and importance. In Mao’s case, it came in the form of physical violence against other Party members and their authority, such as during the Cultural Revolution. For Xi, it manifests in the removal of checks and balances, such as the removal of the limit on terms we began with. Xi also uses tactics of public humiliation to discredit his rivals – a tactic which former leader Hu Jintao fell victim to when he was forcibly removed from the 20th National Party Congress. With regards to policy, Xi resembles Mao in his enthusiasm for reform. Major initiatives to combat the slowing of growth, such as the “Great Rebalancing” initiative aimed to move the economy towards services and consumption which could be viewed as a less spectacular version of Mao’s "Great Leap Forward" (an initiative designed to grow industry and agriculture simultaneously). Similarly, foreign policy is a distinct part of both tenures – one might point to the examples of the Korean War (relating to Mao) and the One Belt One Road initiative (relating to Xi).
To gain more of an insight on the Cultural Revolution, check out this explainer by the BBC:
While Mao's Great Leap Forward was a radical and disastrous attempt to rapidly transform China into a socialist society through large-scale industrialiSation and collectivisation, Xi Jinping's Great Rebalancing aims for sustainable economic development by shifting focus from export-led growth to domestic consumption, innovation, and reducing economic inequality.
To understand more on the Great Leap Forward, check this out:
Despite this, a fundamental difference underpins the two leaders: the position that the China they lead holds on the world stage. As the second largest economy responsible for 31% of global manufacturing, Xi’s geo-political influence dwarfs that which Mao held. His actions could therefore be interpreted as more consequential.
Perhaps more obviously, Xi’s use of state violence is drastically less severe than Mao’s often genocidal whims. The symptoms of this difference have manifested in numerous protests, most recently against the government’s zero-COVID policy. Marchers, whilst shouting slogans such as “down with Xi”, held pieces of blank paper to signify their lack of free expression under invigorated state censorship. This type of foundational challenge to the system was last seen in the protests of 1989, and the government only regained control through brute force (now known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre). Whether Xi can sustain a move towards one-man autocracy without the key tool used by Mao – terror – is doubtful.
Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute has argued that whilst Xi may have strengthened China’s political system now, he has made it less endurable in the long-term (Tsang and Cheung 2022). With increasing levels of dissent, a falling population, and a destruction of political convention, Xi has begun his third term in a volatile landscape. Whether he moves more towards precedents set by Mao, or carves his own path for China, remains to be seen.
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