.png)
Despite what populists may want you to believe, complex problems do not have simple answers. The rise of populism is no exception to this. Political scientists have long fought over economic or cultural factors being the foremost explanation. Many arguments, however, fail to recognise the inherently reactionary nature of populism that can be seen as a failure of both the left and right to appeal to their traditional support bases.
Populism is a political strategy that aims to resonate with the common populace who believe their interests are overlooked by the prevailing elite.
Notable populists include figures like Hugo Chávez, Donald Trump, and Marine Le Pen.
The adoption of neo-liberal economic policy in the late 20th century resulted in a fall in the number of workers in Western industry. This demographic was the archetypal support base of the dominant left-wing parties of the time, and thus as their numbers decreased, so too did their support. In order to remain electorally relevant, the left was forced to expand its appeal beyond industrial workers, and in doing so began to adopt a more centrist economic policy. An example of this phenomenon in the UK, would be New Labour’s continued privatisation under the Private Finance Initiative and refusal to scale-back anti-collective-bargaining legislation.
You can find a great overview of the Private Finance Initiative in this Investopediea Page or in the below video:
As a result, the traditional support base of the left had been isolated by their party's policy, giving the anti-establishment rhetoric of populist parties more appeal. This logic does not, however, explain why populists have also seen such support amongst other electorates, namely the more wealthy middle class. Such voters tend to perceive centrist policy as beneficial, and therefore the left’s move to the centre would do nothing to drive their support for populism.
Much like how the traditional support base of parties on the left tended to be working-class industrial workers, the traditional support base of the right tended to be older, middle-class voters. Successive generations have brought to light the increased importance of socially liberal values, such as LGBTQ rights, environmental policy and racial equality. Although these changes have led to increased social tolerance, they have also prompted a cultural backlash from some groups.
Research shows that some (mostly older, less educated, white men) tend to feel threatened by being told that their views are 'politically incorrect', and as such may feel 'marginalised' in their own country. In the case of these individuals being middle-class, the effects are exacerbated by their party of choice (usually the right), adopting more liberal social policies - usually already adopted by the left. Much of the population (both working class and middle class) hold conservative social values, and it is not true that middle-class voters are inherently less socially progressive than their working-class counterparts. Rather, the lack of economic factors in explaining support for populism amongst this group means that a cultural backlash experienced by some has driven populist sentiment.
An example of this phenomenon in action would be the Conservative Party's adoption of liberal social policy in the 2010s. For example, in 2013, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, passed the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act, legalising same-sex marriage at a time when 'socially conservative voters and a tranche of Conservative MPs' actively opposed the bill. Following this support for UKIP - a right-wing populist party that supported rolling back rights for LGBTQ people - rose to 13% of the popular vote in the 2015 general election. This is not to say that these examples of populism arose specifically because of those particular policies alone, but rather that they can be seen as examples of the right becoming more progressive, thus alienating a portion of the electorate.
At this point one may question that the economic policy of many populist parties is often far more right-wing than parties on the left, even after they have moved to the centre, and therefore it seems illogical that many working-class people would support such groups. As said before however, this argument does not take into account the inherently reactionary nature of populist politics. Populism’s perceived value comes less from actual policy commitments, but rather the extent of their anti-establishment positioning. Applying this logic, a charismatic leader who effectively communicates their policy divergences with the establishment, would be most appealing. One such example can be seen in the rise of Argentinian libertarian Javier Milei, whose far-right economic policies are unlike others in the Argentinian legislature.
Individual factors such as charisma, corporate backing, and media support all play a role in influencing the success of right-wing populism over left-wing populism. That being said, the logic laid out above presents a compelling narrative for why we have seen populist parties draw support from all areas of the political spectrum.
Comments