.png)
Since the dawn of the ‘space age’ in the 1950s, the United States (US) and Russia have committed to fostering cooperation in space, at least in theory. Yet, their commitments were not realised until after the 1990s, which also marked the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Subsequent years brought increased Russian integration into outer-space programs, with the US inviting Russia to contribute to developing the International Space Station (ISS) in 1993. Russia also cooperated closely with Europe on rover and lunar missions through the European Space Agency. However, this long-standing cooperation has diminished with the West’s imposition of sanctions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Any hopes of cooperation have been further damaged by the Kremlin’s rumoured decision to develop a nuclear space weapon, potentially as a response to its increasing diplomatic isolation from the West.
Russia’s alleged willingness to militarise outer space and extrapolate great power competition and rivalry beyond the confines of Earth has serious geopolitical ramifications for leading space powers such as the US and China. In February 2024, the US Defence Department and the intelligence community identified growing progress in Russia’s pursuit of developing anti-satellite weapons, specifically a nuclear electromagnetic pulse. This development would be a violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space. Amidst the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war and consequently strained relations with the West, Russia’s incentive to establish dominance in the space race undoubtedly creates inevitable geopolitical risks.
Russia’s reported development of a nuclear space weapon is likely to have ramifications for the future of its relations with China. Aside from Russia’s strained diplomatic relations with the West, which stemmed from its invasion of Crimea in 2014 and its threats to abandon mutual cooperation with the US concerning the ISS, its potential determination to create a nuclear space weapon may hinder relations with close partners like China. Although Russia and China have reaffirmed their cooperation in developing a Sino-Russo lunar nuclear plant, any impudent Russian actions in advancing nuclear weapons into space may also threaten the prevalence of Chinese navigation satellites in orbit, thereby risking the exacerbation of geopolitical tensions with its close allies and potentially deepening its diplomatic isolation.
The prospect of such widespread destruction of navigation satellites suggests a high probability of accentuated geopolitical tensions, particularly with states possessing significant assets in outer space, such as the US, China, and India. The fundamental threat of a pre-emptive nuclear strike in case of a crisis is significantly heightened, especially given that space-based nuclear weapons can permeate higher orbits beyond the reach of ground-based anti-satellite systems. In the Russian context, the development of an anti-satellite nuclear weapon in space would likely serve as a form of leverage, or a bargaining tactic, when negotiating demands with the West and countering the possibility of diplomatic isolation, especially in geopolitical scenarios such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Ultimately, the threat of irreversible destruction is highly likely to incentivise the West, among other threatened states, to bolster defence spending allocated to developing missile defences in outer space and prioritise the development of their own space-based nuclear armaments.
For more on the specifics of space conflict, check out this article by Samuel Pryor:
More importantly, these possibilities facilitate the emergence of a new arms race and boundless opportunities for international stakeholders to develop newer, combative nuclear space arms or strengthen existing satellites and defence systems. As much as Russia’s development of nuclear space weapons generates geopolitical tensions by leaving outer space asset-heavy states threatened, it is likely also to open up opportunities for government agencies, investors, and private companies to strengthen existing defence mechanisms and introduce more advanced systems. For example, Russia’s decision to leave the ISS and establish its own space station has invariably enabled space corporations like SpaceX and Northrop Grumman to emerge as contenders to help NASA build a propulsion system to replace Russian assistance in running the ISS. As such, it is likely that increasing research and development (R&D) opportunities in space arms and systems will transpire due to Russia’s nuclear advances, opening new avenues for private and government-run space corporations.
In sum, Russia’s potentially revolutionary nuclear ambition in outer space will likely create considerable security risks, even on a preliminary level where its apparent intentions have yet to manifest into concrete actions, for prominent space powers such as the US, China, and India who have significant investments and assets in outer space. Even so, the breakout of a nuclear arms race in space will undeniably cause increased investment opportunities for private and government-run space corporations to support the development of nuclear defence and alternate sensing and communications systems to anticipate and combat such threats. Ultimately, the nature of Russia’s nuclear outer space policy may extrapolate geopolitical tensions to space, one of the rare policy realms that has historically fostered cooperation and mutual trust between Russia and the US.
Yorumlar