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Can we ever be safe?
(Note: this article investigates the security dilemma, a key element of the realist theory of international relations. For an introduction to realism, check out Omera Shaikh's article “The Tenets of Realism”)
The security dilemma, an integral part of the realist theory of international relations, was first coined by John H. Herz in 1950. The basis of this concept are the realist assumptions that the ultimate goal of states is survival and that the international stage exists in a state of anarchy – meaning that there is no higher power than states. Because of this anarchy, states are constantly fearful; they are aware that other states have the offensive capabilities to damage to them, and they can never know another state’s intentions, and so they can never be sure that another state won’t use its offensive capacity against them. For this reason, states exist in a “self-help system”, where they can rely on no one but themselves to achieve their goals – which is ultimately survival. The main method that states use to ensure their survival is to increase their military power, which enhances their security by making it more difficult for another state to attack them. However, the security dilemma states that when state A increases its security through military means, it will also decrease the security of other states, as they cannot be certain that state A will not use its increased military strength for attacks against them. The insecurity these other states feel leads them to increase their security through military means to the point in which they are stronger than state A in order to deter an attack, but state A then perceives this offensively, and further increases its military capacity, which continues in a vicious cycle or “arms race”, and the world becomes an increasingly more dangerous place. However, to state that this dilemma will follow every time a state attempts to increase its security would be much too simple and unnecessarily pessimistic. So, when can states increase their security without other states becoming insecure?
You can check out a great analogy for "The Security Dilemma" depicted in everyday life to give you a better idea of what it is and how it works:
This question is addressed in depth in Jervis’ seminal 1978 article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”. Jervis states that whether or not a state can increase its security without being perceived as a threat by others depends on whether offence or defence has an advantage, and whether there is a distinction between offensive and defensive technologies. Defensive and offensive advantage refers to whether attacking or defending is easier and most feasible. When offence has the advantage (i.e. when it is easier and cheaper to attack than to defend), Jervis states that the security dilemma is at its most vicious, because those who attack have the advantage, encouraging states to increase their security through expanding and striking first before the states around them can do the same, because in this situation, those who strike first win. When defence has the advantage, states can increase their defences significantly without increasing the threat they pose to states by the same amount, and if the defensive advantage is strong enough, then it makes aggression completely unfeasible, which allows states to circumvent the security dilemma. A concrete example of this is seen in Japan, which has a strong defensive advantage due to being made of islands, and having heavily mountainous terrain; these features make it very costly to invade compared to the cost of defending. This means that Japan has less of an incentive to enter into a costly arms race when those around it invest in their militaries, because Japan’s geography makes invasion so challenging (this does not overcome the threat posed by nuclear weapons though), although external factors like pressure from the United States to act as a deterrent in the Indo-Pacific region mean that Japan still maintains a high level of military expenditure.
The other major variable in determining whether states can avoid the security dilemma is whether offensive and defensive technologies can be distinguished. This refers to whether the methods used by a state to increase its security also possess the capacity for offence. If a state uses technology to increase its defences that cannot be used in attack, it can completely nullify the security dilemma, because other states will not feel threatened by their actions. However, this distinction has been significantly criticised by prominent scholars, including Mearsheimer and Huntington. These critics state that no technology can be distinctly categorised as offensive or defensive. Tanks guarding a border can just as easily be used for offence, and even defensive fortifications can provide an offensive advantage by preventing a counterattack whilst on the offence. Take the even more explicitly defensive example of Israel’s Iron Dome, which serves the sole purpose of destroying missiles targeted at Israel. Even though seemingly defensive, the Iron Dome presents a clear offensive advantage in that Israel can attack other states whilst remaining effectively invulnerable to their missile attacks, reducing the number of tools available to opponents to repel their attacks. Thus, it seems that it is very difficult to meaningfully distinguish defensive and offensive weapons as Jervis claims we can, meaning that states building up supposedly defensive weapons are unlikely to escape the security dilemma, and will still threaten other states.
Overall, it seems that determining whether the costly arms races under the security dilemma will occur involves a complex set of variables, most significantly the defensive and offensive balance of a conflict, where when defence has the advantage, states can feel relatively unthreatened by other states increasing their security. Jervis’ other major claim that states can avoid the security dilemma by only utilising defensive technology seems invalid, because of the difficulty in distinguishing defensive and offensive weapons.
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