International institutions since their inception have consistently faced numerous criticisms, however, one of the most fundamental is that such organisations represent and exert powers reminiscent of imperialism. When assessing how convincing this criticism is, this article will subscribe to Michael Doyle’s definition of empire as ‘a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy of the other – effective sovereignty, the subordinate periphery’. Not all activities or aspects of international institutions can be universally characterised as imperialistic, yet anti-colonial scrutiny is indeed essential to ensure that organisations operate in a way that upholds equity and justice on a global scale.
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Proponents of liberal institutionalism such as Robert Keohane have explained their support of the theory utilising the rational choice theory, presenting actors as egoists, a method regularly taken by the realist school of thought. In this way, he argues that a cooperative international regime can form among egoists both with and without a hegemon. For the latter, Keohane postulates that a hegemon may help to create shared interests by providing rewards for cooperation and punishments for defection. This in turn creates mutual confidence between states who are thus encouraged to partake in common action to produce joint gains. Such principles imply that the formation of international institutions is a positive addition to enabling more equitable relations among actors at varying stages of development. He also notes that a hegemon is not necessary for this to occur. By using rational choice analysis, it is suggested that cooperation can be pursued by rational ‘narrowly’ self-interested governments when there are incentives to form such a regime. This is most convincingly argued with use of the theory of collective goods which evidences instances in which cooperation must be taken to avoid problems of collective action. For example, only members of the economic institution of the IMF can borrow from its fund but non-members can also borrow capital if it would be detrimental or disruptive to the workings of the global economy so is needed to stabilise exchange rates or avoid debt collapse. Conversely, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is set up in a way that countries who refuse to accept rules can be excluded from benefits. Therefore, one of Keohane’s strongest arguments in favour of the fairness instilled as a product of international institutions, is displayed as he emphasises their value regarding ‘overcoming political market failure’, which arises regardless of the structural feature of hegemony.
Critics of the IMF have long argued it to be an institution that propagates Western Hegemony, for more on this via an insightful analysis focusing on the impacts of this issue on Latin America, check out this Harvard Political Review article.
The importance of the topic of human rights cannot be ignored when discussing the influence of imperialism on international institutions. This is due to their role in institutionalising the right to self-determination and propelling a rethinking of state sovereignty ‘that inspired a far-reaching reconstitution of the postwar international order’, according to Adom Getachew. This was primarily engendered not directly after the establishing of the United Nations, but rather 15 years later with the passing of resolution 1514 which described self-determination as a right to all peoples, creating the external legal conditions for formal international non-domination and the institution of popular sovereignty. Although anti-colonial nationalists discussed human rights prior to the founding of the UN, the formalisation of binding covenants provided opportunities for them to ‘explicitly mobilise the malleable discourse of international human rights as a critique of imperialism’. The most crucial implication of this passing, however, was its delegitimising of imperial rule and rejecting hierarchy as criteria for statehood was no longer reliant on material advantages as well as promoting the plurality of political communities by ensuring one did not dominate another. Furthermore, the process of decolonisation allowed post-colonial states to use their increasing numbers and majority to somewhat overcome the paralysis and structural imbalance in the UN. Thereby, there is some evidence to suggest that the multilateral decision making invested in the structure of international institutions gave voice to smaller states.
In conclusion, the characterisation of international institutions as imperialist is highly dependent on different perspectives. Some critics argue that powerful nations or blocs dominate international institutions, shaping policies and decisions to serve their own interests. From this viewpoint, powerful countries may use international institutions to advance their geopolitical agendas, potentially at the expense of less powerful nations. International institutions, on the other hand, serve important functions in promoting global cooperation, peace, development, and addressing transnational challenges, seen in the wake of decolonisation and human rights violations.
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